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I

There is much to be said for the argument that there are no facts
without theory.

But there is also some force in the line, that "if you

cannot measure it, it does not exist."

Theories of economic development

and growth provide weak and uncertain guidance to empirical researchers

in development economics, so that progress in this area i~ likely to arise
from the interplay of hypotheses borrowed or adapted from all branches of
economics with laborious empirical work.

In this process standard economic

theory itself should become richer by its greater exposure to Third World
circumstanc es.

Note how, nowadays, macroeconom ists of industrializ ed

countries try to catch up, after many years of neglect, with the infla
tionary experience of some Latin American countries, an experience which
includes many instances of the "stagflation " which fits so uneasily into
standard models.
This paper, then, supposes that there is no shortage of hypotheses,
hunches and insights which could be tested against Third World data, nor a
lack of analyticall y oriented concepts, as phrased by Simon Kuznets, to
guide us (even if tentatively ) in translating raw primary data into quanti
tative economic measures.

The problem is choosing the more interesting

hypotheses, establishin g insightful categories, .and finding or generating
fresh data.

Indeed, the latter aspect is so serious that one increasingl y

prefers to read papers which involve no elaborate hypotheses but present
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new solid data about an interesting issue without more than a coherent
"story" to bring the numbers together.
There has been a tendency in the area of development economics to
manufacture pseudo-theories to explain pseudo-facts, often leading without
much pause to persistent policy advocacy.

The excuse that "data are not

there" has been used to justify much nonsense.

Some of the most interesting

work done in the development area in recent years involves this systematic
examination of empirical evidence, which ends up giving a picture of reality
significantly different from that commonly assumed in both the theorizing
and policy-making of development.

Examples include the Kindleberger work

on terms of trade, that of MacBean on export instability and, more recently,
the work of several authors on the nature and extent of the problem of mar
ginality and unemployment.

We will return to this type of empirical work

below.
Rather than providing an exhaustive list of all data which it would be
good to have, this paper will focus on data sources and techniques of ob
taining data which, in my view, promise the largest pay-offs in development
research.

Such a view, of course, reflects my judgement about which are

the most interesting and important researchable topics in the area, as well
as about how contemporary capitalistic developing economies work.

Analysts

with different interests in the pure research-policy spectrum, or located
in other parts of the world, or with different preconceptions, could very
well come out with different conclusions.

Before getting into all that,

one should start by reviewing the major progress made during the post-Second
World War period in data availability for development research.
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II

Much has been accomplished dur,ing the last two-and-a-half decades in
expanding the data base available for researchers in economic development.
The starting point was meager indeed:

the number of developing countries

with national accounts, input-output tables and flow-of-funds tables were
few in 1950.

By 1975, just about every developing country appears in United

Nations publications with~ kind of national accounts, and a:..1 increasing
number of countries boast of other components of comprehensive macro-economic
statistics, including those on international transactions and in the monetary
field.
With all their problems ( and they have many), these masses of data have
supported a narrowing of our ignorance regarding the process of growth and
structural change which, by historical standards, must be rated as very
impressive.

The Kuznets-Chenery "laws of development," of course, could

not have been produced without such data base.

Those observed regularities

and the discipline of available national accounts have (although perhaps
less than they should have) limited fanciful and sterile debates, channeling
hypothesis-gen eration toward more fruitful areas.

Furthermore, these data

are on the whole easily available in national and international publications
found in most libraries all over the world.
Besides their usefulness for comparative work on growth and structural
change, national accounts have in some developing countries been pushed back
at least into the 1930s and 1920s, stimulating research on such topics as
how well different types of developing countries fared during the Great
Depression, and also providing longer time series for testing secular views
on growth and structural change.
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It is not a difficult task to point out that, in spite of the great
deal accomplished in the area of national accounts, many gaps and imperfec
tions remain.

In many developing countries, the raw data on which the

accounts are based leave much to be desired; furthermore, it is not clear
that these matters are improving with time.

In some countries, after an

initial burst of enthusiasm setting up the national accounts system, the
collection and processing of raw data stagnates and is surpassed by the
changing economic reality of the country.
accounts is the frequent result.

Increasingly misleading national

In some cases, the preparation of national

accounts has drawn resources away from government statistical offices
generating raw primary data, leading to a decline in their output.
Most developing countries have not moved much beyond minimum national
accounts.

Input-output tables, flow-of-funds and particularly aggregate

income distribution estimates remain relatively rare.

Where they exist,

it is even rarer to find systematic efforts for periodic actualizations of
those tables.

Even the core national accounts are seldom available at inter

vals more frequent than every year; quarterly series remain a rarity in de
veloping countries.

Indeed, prompt short-term economic indicators in

developing countries are extremely scarce.

Cyclical macroeconomic manage

ment in developing countries, an area neglected in the literature, typically
evolves amidst great uncertainty as to what is really going on in the economy.
In the area of cross-country comparisons, the data base has not allowed
an adequate separation of "true" structural differences from those which
show up in national accounts data simply due to differences in relative
prices from country to country.

One example which I have frequently used

involves the substantial differences found in the relative prices of capital
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goods from country to country, differences which cast serious doubts about
the meaningfulness of frequently-seen comparisons of rates of capital forma
tion among countries.

Comparisons across input-output tables are also ham

pered by differences in relative price structures.
But it is not my intention to build.up to an across-the-board plea for
more and better national accounts in developing countries.

1

At zero opportunity

cost, that of course would be splendid, and would stimulate some good research.
But given high opportunity costs and my preferences regarding research priorities,
I will proceed to more specific pleading.

III

Aggregation into national macroeconomic magnitudes has been recognized
for a long time as a less defensible procedure for developing thaTI for
developed countries, given the greater structural and regional heterogeneity
of the former.

If the national accounts were put together from regional·

and sectoral bits and pieces in such a way that disaggregation were only a
matter of running the adding-up machinery backwards, much of the following
discussion would be unnecessary.

In fact, aggregate investment is not

typically obtained from adding up estimates of all firms' investments, but
from imports of machinery and equipment plus. construction licenses issued;
national savings are derived as a residual from other magnitudes; and so on.
In most countries, national accounts emerge as a precious package and attempts
to decompose it run the risk of leaving the researcher empty-handed.
Unless the national accounts of developing countries are substantially
improved, an unlikely prospect, the juice which can be further extracted from
them, either in time series or cross-section studies, appears limited.

A more
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promising path toward greater understanding of the structure and workings
of the modern sector of market-oriented developing countries would be to
focus on, say, the characteristics of the largest 200 private corporations
in each country.

One can conjecture that such a group accounts for nearly

all of the output generated by "dynamic" industrial branches, public utilities
and large-scale mining.

Their share of private capital formation, outside

housing and consumer durables, is also likely to be very large.

The same

group will also account for a dominant share of foreign trade, and interna
tional capital flows.

If, to that group, one adds the 30 or so largest public

and banking enterprises, one would have the core of the modern sector of most
developing countries.
Data on such a group of economic units is plentiful, but buried.

Even

developing countries with weak administrative machinery receive a steady
flow of economic information from this group.

There are income and sales

taxes to pay or seek exemptions from; labor legislation requiring the reporting
of employment and social security taxes; import licensing demanding evidence
of need; price control regulations demanding justification of price increases;
banking regulations, and so on.

These data sources, suitably processed, could,

in most countries, provide a running census of the "commanding heights" of
the economy.
I became conscious of this rather obvious way of tackling data needs
when studying the Colombian import control system.

The officials in charge

of that system kindly allowed me to examine a large number of import license
requests, which, I quickly discovered, were a golden data mine.

Each company

provided data for current and past years on such variables as employment,
sales, taxes of various kinds paid, installed capacity, wages, inventories, etc.
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Once a decision had been made on the request, alas, these forms were destroyed.
From the sample of request I was able to study, it was clear that a good deal
of concentration existed.

For example, just 80 industrial companies captured

in the sample accounted for 30 percent of all 1970 Colombian imports; these
same companies accountes for 21 percent of all income and sales taxes paid
during 1970 in Colombia, and employed 19 percent of all those engaged in manu
facturing in the same year (3, 1976).
There are a large number of issues which could be fruitfully studied in
the context of ample data for the core economic units.

All of the standard

development questions on such matters as efficiency of trade policy, choice
of techniques, productivity changes, etc., can be asked.

Furthermore, the

questions raised are likely to become more pointed when put in the context
of the structural reality of the modern sector.

Rather than imagining many

atomistic firms behind some macro variable like total manufacturing output,
one will have to face obvious departures from simplistic theories of the
firm.

Both empirical work and theorizing should benefit from the more

realistic starting point; one is likely to understand the play better after
having identified the major actors.
Let me again illustrate what I have in mind by reference to my work on
Colombian foreign trade.

From much of the debate on export promotion vs.

import substitution, one could have imagined that the economic actors on
both sides of that dichotomy were substantially different types: one type
of unit labor-intensive, competitive and small, while the other was pictured
as capital-intensive, large and heavily dependent on government favors.
Yet it turns out that in Colombia, for the period I examined, many of the
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firms engaged in new manufactured exports had been, or were still, engaged
2
.
.
ub stitution.
.
. muc h imports
in

While pure trade theory features individual industries having identical
linear homogeneous production functions within and across countries as units
of analysis ("wine and cloth"), often one finds large firms producing jointly
both "wine and cloth."

Rather than attempt to separate the various activities

of a given firm so that they can fit into standard industrial classifications,
a process typically full of doubtful procedures, in many instances it may be
better to focus on the large multi-product firm as the unit of analysis.
Focussing on the core economic units should advance research in a
number of other lines.

It obviously facilitates measurement of the degree

of foreign ownership in developing economies, and provides a framework for
comparing the behavior and characteristics of domestic and foreign-owned
firms in such things as exporting, research and development and choice of
technique.

The history of a country's industrialization may best be written

as the history of the rise and expansion of the core economic units, of con
glomerates and economic groups embr,acing several of those uni ts, and of their
interaction with government policy which stimulated such industrialization.
It may, however, be much more difficult to obtain data on the history of the
core economic units and of economic groups than on their current operations.
The difficulty to which reference has been made is not the political,
man-made variety.

In addition, many may fear that focussing on core economic

units for data gathering is but a first step toward their eventual socializa
tion.

Somewhat spurious pleas for protecting corporate "privacy" will be

heard also.

Be that as it may, large companies and powerful economic groups
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are likely to feel more comfortable with their numbers diluted in macro
economic aggregates than with schemes which highlight their largeness.
Individual researchers may still obtain their cooperation for special projects;
this is likely to remain the most realistic path toward obtaining a better
understanding of the role and behavior of core economic units and groups in
a number of development topics.

Individual researchers may find it difficult

to cover all 200 top firms, and may have to remain satisfied with sample
surveys.

But that takes us to the next topic.

IV
Exclusive emphasis on large companies and groups would neglect some
very important research areas, such as income distribution, unemployment/
underemployment and extreme poverty, as well as sectors dominated by small
firms and farms.

The fresh data needed to get a firmer understanding and

better measurement of these matters and sectors is unlikely to come from the
further refinement of national accounts.
may not be the answer either.

Better and more frequent censuses

The most efficient, although far from cheap,

instrument here seems to be the greater use of sample surveys.
In a lively Presidential address to the Eastern Economic Association,
Barbara R. Bergmann chided U.S. economists for not following the example of
scientists in generating their own data base [l, 1974].

She also advocated

a much greater use of sample surveys to find out "first hand" about economic
reality, rather than waiting for a government agency to produce numbers which
are seldom exactly what we wanted.

Her remarks, which make sense even in a

country where government offices turn out massive amounts of high quality
data, apply a fortiori to developing countries.

Similar points have been
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made by G. H. Orcutt (8, 1970].
There is already evidence supporting enthusiasm for sample surveys in
development research.

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the conjecture

of large and growing unemployment in developing countries became so publicized
that it soon was taken as fact.
with this problem followed.

Dramatic policy proposals for how to deal

Only somewhat later came careful efforts to

ascertain the extent and characteristics of open unemployment.

Such efforts

naturally involved increasingly sophisticated sample surveys.
The picture of open unemployment yielded by that research, such as that
of J. Ramos [9, 1974], certainly has a richness and sophistication not present
in earlier discussions of th~ topic.

Heavy participation of non-head of

households and young persons among the openly unemployed raises serious
questions, for example, about the connection between open unemployment,
poverty and income distribution.

That research also probes toward better

measures of underemployment in city and country.

It is striking that only

after two-and-a-half decades of theorizing and mostly casual empiricism
about surplus labor in development, one begins to see now systematic empirical
studies on the topic.
A related area where sample surveys show great promise is the mapping
out of "heterogeneous poverty" in the Third World.

The logical data sources

for researching this issue are of course national censuses, or stratified
samples drawn from them.

Impressive results have been obtained by Albert

Fishlow via that route [4, 1972].

But the censuses are infrequent and not

all developing countries may have the administrative infrastructure to carry
out as thorough a census as those recent ones for Brazil.

Furthermore, if

emphasis is placed on studying the characteristics of poverty, rather than
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income distribution, even partial surveys may provide more flexible and
direct tools of research than censuses.

They certainly are a natural com

plement to infrequent censuses which remain necessary for guiding the struc
turing and design of samples.
Have the poorest fifty percent of the population benefitted from growth
in developing countries?

Conflicting answers one hears to this question

reflect the shabby state of empirical work in development economics.
Answering it in a somewhat more scientific manner may involve not only
greater reliance on tools such as sample surveys but also the refinement
of welfare indices, and the taking into account of the poor's own perception
as to whether they are better or worse off.

A modest new rural water supply

system may make villagers feel much better off, even though in the national
accounts such projects would have a negligible impact on any sort of quanti
tative indicator.

Much of the same can be said about the provision of other

public services in the areas of health, education, transportation, etc.

How

much of the welfare gains arising from the erradication of malaria and the
decline in infant mortality have been captured in the national accounts of
developing countries?

Just about any junk-producing new import substituting

industry has had a bigger impact on those national accounts!
United Nations efforts to develop indicators of social welfare could be
very helpful.

Simple data on numbers of bicycles, radios and shoes in a

village, and on materials used for roofing may say more about welfare than
"guesstimates" on aggregate per capita consumption.

My own favorite measure

of welfare and its dispersion among social classes is life expectancy; there
is no more brutal indicator of inequality than the higher life expectancy
of the rich (and of their children) than of the poor.
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On the whole, the sample survey may be the closest instrument we have
to those in the experimental sciences, where the researcher typically
generates his own hypotheses and his own data.

Its greater use in develop

ment economics may limit the negative consequences of the impossibility of
controlled experiments, as noted by Simon Kuznets:

great loss in data

economy and proliferation of competing hypotheses that survive for long
periods of time [7, 1973, especially pp. 248-249].
Why have development economists been so slow in following the example
of their sociology and political science colleagues in using sample surveys?
Properly designed sample surveys require team-work, continuity of effort and
organization, not to mention faith in empirical research with long gestation
periods.

These are stiff requirements, particularly to a profession afflicted

with extreme individualism, theoretical hubris and, in developing countries,
threatened by institutional instability.

But the sharply diminishing returns

available in further squeezing public data sources is pushing us in the right
direction.

One hears that in some developing countries, private consulting

firms are emerging which offer to carry out sample surveys with a high degree
of sophistication.
Autonomous research institutions in developing countries have a natural
comparative advantage for this kind of empirical work if institutional stability
can be maintained.

Here is an area where economists in developing countries

could take up an important research and pedagogical leadership role.

Such a

role would exclude both being simple gatherers of data to be processed in
research centers of developed countries, and being gatherers of data which
never get analyzed in a systematic fashion.
lightly.

Neither danger should be dismissed
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V

Trade and financial links between developed and developing countries
have historically generated a disproportionate amount of data, contributing
to the appeal of research in the area of trade and development.

The inter

national institutions which emerged from the Second World War have contributed
much to stimulate and standardize the production of data on international
trade and financial flows.

Nevertheless, important gaps remain.

The biggest scandal in this field remains the lack of serious indices
of international prices.

After many years of arguments about trends in the

terms of trade of developing countries, most international agencies still
rely on unit value indices for imports and exports in computing terms of
trade, .in spite of widespread agreement that such unit value indices are
rubbish, or close to it, as shown by Kravis and Lipsey [5, 1971].

As in the

case of unemployment and underemployment, the amount of theorizing and policy
debate on the terms of trade rel a tiire to the data base on the phenomenon
itself makes the discipline of development economics appear singularly
frivolous.
The rise of multinational corporations is a matter of hardly exclusive
interest to development economists, but a greater flow of information on
their activities would certainly facilitate objective research in the contro
versial area of their net contributions to development.

The emphasis on

obtaining data from core economic units, advocated earlier in this paper,
should be helpful here.

But given the international nature of these units,

international efforts at data gathering will also be necessary.

The United

Nations has started such an endeavor, but the field is a difficult one, as
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noted by Somav{a (10, 1974-].

Part of the difficulty lies in the conceptual

weakness of economic ideas in areas such as that of technological transfer;
measurement becomes particularly difficult when one is not sure about the
nature of what one is trying to measure!
Pressures from the United Nations could be helpful in inducing the home
countries of multinational corporations to cooperate in exchanges of informa
tion regarding their activities, a cooperation which has not been spontaneously
forthcoming until now.

These efforts may eventually lead to a commonly agreed

body of "stylized facts" on which positive and normative theories about multi
national corporations can be firmly based.
Finally, international agencies seem the logical bodies to improve data
availability on international migration of skilled and unskilled labor, a
subject which is likely to become one of increasing interest to development
analysts.

VI
From all that has been said above, it should be clear that I am
skeptical regarding how successful the researcher in development economics
will be in generating new insights by just relying on information already
accumulated in libraries, whether located in developed or developing countries.
It is doubtful that libraries in developed countries should, or could,
efficiently gather data on core economic units or on the small but growing
body of sample surveys scattered throughout the Third World.

International

organizations may be able to provide an inventory of major bodies of such
data and their location, particularly household sample surveys~ a list which
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can then be disseminated through libraries.

But the researcher will sooner

or later have to go to the source of those data to check on gathering
methods, robustness, and definitions.
Indeed,

my

bet is that more often than not already collected data

"lying around," unused and unanalyzed, in the Third World, will prove of
minor use to researchers.

It is an old game in our profession to dream up

hypotheses which can be tested against available data, a procedure frequently
accompa:iied by many "proxies" and "dummies," and leading to murky results.
But my conjecture is that the more interesting and focussed a hypothesis in
develop;nent economics, the less likely is that data "lying around" will be
of help in testing it.

Like the na·tural scientists, the pioneering develop

ment researcher may have to devise not only his or her own hypothesis, but
also gather the fresh data needed for testing.
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Notes
~':Comments on an earlier draft by Benjamin I. Cohen, Simon Kuznets and
Hugh Patrick are gratefully acknowledged.

The paper also benefitted from

discussions at the 1975 Kiel seminar of the International Economic Associa
tion.
1

simon Kuznets has called for more comparative analysis of economic

growth experience [6, 1972, especially pp. 80-86].

I share this view, but

place that area of research more in the "growth" than in the "development"
category, meaning by the latter the analysis of the early stages of growth
acceleration and structural change in countries with an income per capita
of, say, less than $1,000.
2

In Asian countries, B. I. Cohen has found a greater degree of speciali-

zation [2, 1975].
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